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Abstract
We develop an overlapping-generations framework with endogenous heterogeneous
inﬂation preferences that incorporates adaptive learning and imperfect empathy. Pref-
erence transmission occurs via a process of socialization, whereby parents and peers
aﬀect the adoption of a particular type revealed at adulthood. Agents then optimize
t h ed e g r e eo fl i f e t i m ei n ﬂation protection to be enacted as mandate for the monetary
authority. Voting equilibria consequently modify the evolving monetary institutions
of a society. Empirical tests, employing an inﬂation aversion measure we construct
from survey data and apply to central bank independence, provide cross-sectional
evidence in support of our theory.
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Is low inﬂation here to stay? Several strands of research provide hints about the likely
permanence of the contemporary low-inﬂation regime. Some insist on the evolution of
monetary institutions, more independent and more focused on price stability during the
recent period of Great Moderation than in the last episode of Great Inﬂation (Crowe and
Meade, 2007). Others point to globalization as a weight on inﬂationary pressures (Gamber
and Hung, 2001; Rogoﬀ, 2003). Still others add to the above observations that central
banks have been learning to control inﬂation better (Sargent, 1999). More deeply rooted
explanations of inﬂation preferences link them to the inﬂation experiences people have
gone through within their own lifetime (Malmendier and Nagel, 2009) and the ‘inﬂation
culture’ societies have built through history (Hayo, 1998; Vaubel, 2003).
There is a voluminous literature on the dynamics of higher-frequency inﬂation — i.e.,
observed monthly, quarterly or yearly — over shorter-run horizons of a few decades (Rudd
and Whelan, 2006, in a closed-economy set-up; Mihailov et al., 2011, in a small open-
economy set-up). Not much is known, however, on what drives lower-frequency inﬂation
— i.e., observed within a lifetime — over longer-run spans of time. In such a context, endo-
genizing individual inﬂation preferences and modeling their aggregation and transmission
across generations is fundamental.
Whereas most of the literature in economics assumes preferences as ‘priors’ which are
endowed to agents and do not change, a more promising route to understand the key
determinants and the sustainability of the recent low-inﬂa t i o nr e g i m ei st ol o o ka tp r e f -
erences as shaped out by evolutionary and cultural forces in society. Dual inheritance
theory in anthropology and other social sciences, treated at length in Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985), suggests that genes (or ‘nature’) are
not the only factor responsible in inﬂuencing traits and practices of individuals. Cul-
ture, deﬁned in a general sense as imitative or social learning typical mostly for humans
(and often dubbed ‘nurture’), is the other crucial factor, whose importance may even
be overwhelming. Indeed, based on experimental eliciting of preferences over giving and
risk-taking from a subject pool of twins, Cesarini et al. (2009) estimate that only about
20% of individual variation is explained by genetic diﬀerences. Moreover, while it takes
a large number of generations for genes to mutate, beliefs, values and behavior inherited
as culture — and the resulting institutions — can be modiﬁed much faster, in a generation
or two, as individuals and societies adapt in response to observation and experience.
In particular, when it comes to the intergenerational transmission of socially-relevant
attitudes, such as those with regard to inﬂation, the entire eﬀect on the dynamics of
preferences would be rather due to the interactions of transmitted culture with adaptive
learning and evolving institutions, as we argue in the present paper. Dessí (2008) re-
lates individual internalization of cultural norms and values to the quality of the existing
institutions, while Dohmen et al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd empirical evidence in favor of the
intergenerational transmission within families of the willingness to take risk or trust oth-
1ers.1 Of course, culture, attitudes and institutions are ultimately moulded by history, as
relevant past experience — e.g., hyperinﬂationary episodes and the abrupt shifts in voting
majorities and monetary institutions they cause — is then transferred as social inheritance
to the next generations. It would, thus, appear natural that, as Scheve (2004) reports,
there is signiﬁcant cross-country variation in inﬂation aversion.
In this paper we endogenize inﬂation preferences as being culturally transmitted from
one generation to another. More precisely, we develop an overlapping-generations (OLG)
framework with two types of agents distinguished by inﬂation preferences that arise from
an adopted endowment structure available over adulthood. Our framework incorpo-
rates adaptive learning and imperfect empathy, and three interdependent channels that
drive the socioeconomic dynamics we aim to highlight. Preference transmission operates
through the ﬁrst channel, ‘socialization’, a process whereby parents and peers aﬀect the
adoption of inﬂation preferences, as they experience the consequences of actual inﬂation
during their lifetime. Then, at the threshold of adulthood, each next generation up-
dates under full information the conditional inﬂation forecast over the horizon of its own
mature life. This is the second, ‘learning’, channel of socioeconomic dynamics captured
by our set-up, whereby generations learn asymptotically the unconditional mean of low-
frequency, or generational, inﬂation. Finally, given heterogeneity in types predetermined
by socialization but the same lifetime inﬂation forecast due to common knowledge, agents
optimally choose the degree of lifetime inﬂation protection they would wish to see enacted
as mandate for the monetary authority. Voting equilibria at the beginning of mature life
of every generation thus modify the evolving monetary institutions of a society, which is
the third channel, ‘institutionalization’, aﬀecting the degree of monetary control in our
theoretical modeling and of central bank independence (CBI) in its empirical translation.
Combining the three channels of socioeconomic dynamics we highlight, learning, socializa-
tion and institutionalization, allows us to investigate the longer-run evolution of inﬂation
preferences and monetary institutions.
In implementing this approach, we follow Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) who build on
the literature within economics on endogenous preferences2 to develop and analyze formal
set-ups where preferences evolve across generations. We extend their work in three ways.
First, we replace the ‘cultural substitution’ assumption — that causes convergence to an
interior steady state with both types coexisting over time in their purely deterministic
framework — with adaptive learning in a dynamic-stochastic environment.3 Our approach
generalizes their result to switching majorities and irregular cycles of higher and lower
degree of inﬂation aversion in the population ﬂuctuating around interior equilibria lasting
1However, Black et al. (2005) ﬁnd limited within-family intergenerational spillover of human capital
in their sample studying educational reforms in Norway in the 1960s. This points to the role played by
variations in socialization eﬀorts as well as outside-family inﬂuences we highlight later on.
2Going back to Becker (1976), Hirshleifer (1977) and Rubin and Paul (1979); Becker (1996) is a widely
cited book.
3For an early analysis of social learning and personality development in cognitive psychology, see, e.g.,
Bandura and Walters (1963); for a compact survey of learning models in economics, see, e.g., Sobel (2000).
2for shorter or longer, or forever (depending on initial conditions and the properties of the
assumed shock processes). Second, we apply the model to study endogenously arising
inﬂation preferences and the resulting evolving monetary institutions, in a theoretical
context as well as through simulations. Third, we take the theory to an appropriate
data set to verify its principal empirical implications, making use of a novel measure of a
nation’s inﬂation aversion we construct from survey d a t a .W er e p o r tr o b u s tc r o s s - s e c t i o n
evidence that a country’s demographic structure, in particular the variation in the share
of retirees (our proxy for the more inﬂation-averse type, as our model and data suggested)
or of their ratio to the share of workers (our proxy for the less inﬂation-averse type), is
a key driver of social preferences with regard to inﬂation. The presented regressions also
conﬁrm the importance of two other major long-run determinants of inﬂation aversion
consistent with our model, namely, experience with past high inﬂa t i o na n dt h ed e g r e eo f
CBI embodied in monetary institutions. Our econometric ﬁndings, thus, broadly support
our analytical framework and simulation results.
It may seem surprising that very few papers have examined the long-run stability of
inﬂation aversion. In addition to the assumption of ﬁxed preferences in theoretical models,
this outcome probably also reﬂects a simple empirical trend: economists now generally
admit that CBI — enshrined in laws and regulations in many countries over the last two
decades — reveals a society’s inﬂation aversion. From such a perspective, then, everything
appears as if the world has evolved towards higher inﬂation aversion, evidenced by the
rising number of central banks made independent or, for the ones which were already, by
the increase in their degree of independence (Crowe and Meade, 2007; Arnone et al., 2009).
Yet, though the trend has been towards more independence, we do not know whether a
reversal would not occur in the future. Such a scenario is not unlikely, for several reasons
captured in our model: the underlying low-frequency inﬂation process may be subject
to shifts or switches, monetary policy control over inﬂation may weaken or strengthen,
objectives and constraints of monetary authorities may evolve accordingly, and political
economy considerations will not cease to matter, e.g., legal attempts to restrict CBI can
be rewarding for short-sighted politicians (Waller, 1991). Hence, this paper delves deeper
by exploring the long-run drivers of inﬂation preferences and monetary institutions.
The paper is further organized as follows. In the next section, we present our OLG
model in a baseline and an extended version and derive our main theoretical results.
Section 3 illustrates the dynamics of our model, ﬁrst analytically for a deterministic
benchmark and then in simulations under alternative parametrizations for the stochastic
version implied by our theory. In section 4, we test empirically the key predictions derived
from the model. Section 5 provides a concluding summary.
2 Theoretical Framework
We here build on the OLG set-up of Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001), to extend and apply
it to adaptive learning and the long-run evolution of endogenous inﬂation preferences and
3monetary institutions.
2.1 Preference Types
A generation consists of a continuum of individuals, each living for two periods (childhood
and adulthood) and having one child. The population is thus constant, and the size of
t h em a t u r eg e n e r a t i o ni na n yp e r i o dt is normalized to 1.W e c o n s i d e r t w o t y p e s o f
preferences in the population, i ∈ {a,b},d e ﬁned on a private good c and a public good
G, as is customary in the public economics literature.
We assume that preference types are complete, or revealed, at the beginning of adult-
hood (in any period t), which coincides with the end of a socialization process during
childhood (in the preceding period t − 1) described further below. To simplify, we as-
sume throughout that types remain unchanged during adulthood.4 At y p ec a nt h e nb e
interpreted, in a broad sense, as reﬂecting a particular endowment of nominal and real
assets and human capital (‘wealth’) available over adulthood, or the adoption of a par-
ticular mature-lifetime ‘portfolio ideology’ or ‘inﬂation-risk behavior’. Along such lines,
we model our preference types as arising from diﬀerences in the structure of an otherwise
equal initial nominal endowment,  . In the beginning of their mature life spanning over
ag i v e np e r i o dt, individuals of a generation that we denote also by t receive this iden-
tical time-invariant lifetime endowment   which is, however, diﬀerentiated — or, rather,
predetermined — by type. If an individual is socialized as (i.e., revealed to be of) type i,
she ‘is assigned’ an initial-period lifetime endowment of which a fraction, 0 <ϕ i < 1,i s
protected (indexed or otherwise privately diversiﬁed) against inﬂation.5 The real value of
her private ﬁnal-period endowment is therefore
 i







πt denotes the (net) rate of low-frequency inﬂation (say, in % per annum, as an
average) over a mature-generation life span t.T y p eb diﬀers in that her initial endowment
is indexed (or diversiﬁed) against inﬂation to a higher extent, ϕb >ϕ a =0 .W ef u r t h e r
assume that the low-frequency, or generational, inﬂation dynamics at the centre of our
interest would depend — among other things — in part on its own past, and in part on
the contemporaneous institutionalized degree of imperfect control a monetary authority
exerts over inﬂation (applicable as from the beginning of each period), as well as on some
disturbance process, εt, i.e., πt = π(πt−1,πt−2,...;G∗
t;εt;·). G∗
t ≡ χib μπ,t−1 i st h ec o s to f
4As in Acemoglu and Jackson (2011), this can be rationalized by some prohibitively high cost to change
one’s type and, hence, behavior, later in mature life. Moreover, Huggett et al. (2011) ﬁnd that, as of age
23, diﬀerences in initial conditions account for more of the variation in lifetime earnings, lifetime wealth
and lifetime utility than do diﬀerences in shocks received over the working lifetime.
5Taking a formal and abstract approach here, we do not go into modeling any speciﬁcv a r i e t yo f
such inﬂation-indexed ﬁnancial instruments or inﬂation-protecting diversiﬁcation portfolio strategies. To
mention just some widely used real-world examples, one may think of the Treasury Inﬂation-Protected
Securities (TIPS) issued in the US by the federal government since 1997 as well as of their private-sector
analogue known as Corporate Inﬂation-Protected Securities (CIPS): see, e.g., Barney and Harvey (2009).
4public protection against inﬂation everybody has to pay, with 0 ≤ χi ≤ 1 and b μπ,t−1
denoting the conditional mean of inﬂation observed through generation t − 1,a sw i l lb e
made more precise further down.
2.2 Learning from History
To keep the set-up as simple and general as possible, we specify the actual law of motion
(ALM) of low-frequency inﬂation as a ﬁrst-order autoregressive (AR(1)) stochastic process
with a time-varying ‘institutional-control’ drift,
πt = −G∗
t + ρπt−1 + εt, (2)
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is the persistence parameter of low-frequency inﬂation and εt is





. Both types are assumed
boundedly rational in the sense of learning adaptively as history unfolds. Under perfect
information and with such a minor deviation from full rationality, agents correctly guess
the linear form of this stochastic ALM and the properties of the exogenous shock and
the drift term, but do not know the true values of ρ, με and σ2
ε. However, at the end of
every period t they observe πt and update its conditional mean b μπ,t.G e n e r a t i o n s w i l l ,
therefore, be converging to the true mean of the inﬂation process in (2) asymptotically,
b μπ,t→∞ → μπ. Of course, this will be so as long as εt and πt do not change (frequently)
their respective laws of motion.
Yet, in our very general set-up agents will not be able to apply recursively ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) under με 6=0and G∗
t 6= G = const as in (2) and to separate
apart estimates of b ρt and b με each period. In that our approach diﬀers from the liter-
ature on least-squares learning (as expounded in Evans and Honkapohja, 2001), which






, and a constant intercept, G. In the latter simpler case and under a
decreasing-gain learning algorithm,6 the perceived law of motion (PLM) all agents use to
forecast inﬂation over their lifetime, conditional on the complete (relevant) history, Ωt,
would be
πt = −b Gt +b ρtπt−1 + εt. (3)
From the PLM, (3), agents then would update recursively by OLS, generation after
generation, their estimate for G (replacing, in the OLS learning context here, our −G∗
t)
and ρ in (2), b Gt and b ρt in (3).7
In the general case of με 6=0and G∗
t 6= G = const we study in this paper, agents will
have to predict inﬂation over their mature lifetime t from its sample mean observed up
6That guarantees convergence to the implied rational expectations equilibrium (REE) — see Evans and
Honkapohja (2001), p. 48.
7Alternatively, under certain assumptions ρ could be gradually learned through Bayesian maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation, as in Buera et al. (2011), among others.
5through t − 1,
E [πt | Ωt]=πe




conditional on the information set Ωt ≡ {G∗
s,πs−1}
t
s=0 that is common knowledge
through historical record. It is well-known in the statistical learning literature (see, e.g.,
Evans and Honkapohja, 2001, p. 62) that the sample mean in (4) corresponds to —
that is, can be equivalently written as — a forecast rule according to which agents form
expectations adaptively from past data with a decreasing gain deterministic sequence,
t−1,s ot h a t 8
πe
t = b πt = πe





Such adaptive learning process implies that all agents share the same forecast rule for
(conditionally) expected inﬂation, b πt. As in Malmendier and Nagel (2009), agents can
therefore forecast inﬂation recursively.9 Note that even if in our case agents know the
legislated intercept G∗
t of the low-frequency inﬂation process, they still have no way to
obtain separate estimates of ρ and με from (2). It is on purpose, for realism’s sake, that
we keep our interest throughout in this very general case.
2.3 Monetary Institutions
To focus on our point, we interpret the degree of control G∗
t in a narrower sense henceforth,
namely as a conservative and independent monetary authority along the lines of Rogoﬀ
(1985). In eﬀect, we consider G∗
t to be the degree of independence (plus conservatism) of
a central bank institution allowing it to control imperfectly generational inﬂation. Each
type i would optimally wish to enshrine its own preferred degree of CBI, Gi∗
t ,t h r o u g h
legislation when voting at the beginning of t. This interpretation introduces a second
channel in our model that contributes to mitigate the consequences of high inﬂation, a
publicly chosen one. Majority voting in parliament through proportional representation10
at the beginning of mature life of each generation decides on a unique degree of CBI to
be enacted throughout their adulthood, G∗
t. Such a modeling is consistent with the
literature that, at least since Strotz (1955), has shown the importance of precommitment
technologies in safeguarding the value of money, and boils down to considering CBI as a
public good. On the contrary, the role of central banks in hyperinﬂations (see Fischer et
al., 2002) provides a reductio ad absurdum argument that, once they deviate from this
8Malmendier and Nagel (2009) use the same decreasing-gain forecast rule in a related, but shorter-run
set-up.
9Diﬀerently from Malmendier and Nagel (2009), our focus is on updating life-span or generational
forecasts of low-frequency inﬂation using a historically accumulating sample, while theirs is on diﬀerences
in forecasting inﬂation between young and old agents due to own experiencing of not coinciding inﬂation
samples.
10Modeling the political system is out of the scope of this article, and we refer the reader to Faust
(1996), Bullard and Waller (2004) or Berentsen and Strub (2009).
6objective, central banks harm the economy, and become a public ‘bad’. Our low-frequency
inﬂation dynamics in (2) thus captures the related evidence mentioned in the Introduction
that the degree of CBI (in addition to its conservatism) tends to be negatively correlated
with inﬂation.
If there is a shift in the voting majority by type at the beginning of t,t h e nG∗
t
substantially diﬀers from G∗
t−1;o t h e r w i s e ,G∗
t is just an ‘update’ of G∗
t−1 by the same
type one generation ahead. Thus, for the same value of the sample mean, b μπ,t−1,t h e
inﬂation forecast b πt will be lower or higher depending on the legislated value of G∗
t.O n c e
G∗
t is voted, throughout t both types pay the social cost of the enacted degree of CBI,
experience inﬂation, which redistributes their real endowments according to (1) and (2),
socialize their children, consume up their remaining endowments, and die at the end of t.
The described sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
Following Bisin and Verdier (2000), we assume that each adult chooses the total
amount of the public good, Gt, knowing that everyone in the society, irrespective of
preference type, will have to contribute an equal share, gt = Gt
1 , towards the cost of
providing the public good.11 Note that in our set-up the beneﬁts and costs of inﬂation or
deﬂation, and hence of the legislated degree of CBI,12 are explicitly captured by equations
(1) and (2), and aﬀect the ﬁn a l( i . e . ,r e a l )e n d o w m e n to fe a c ht y p e , i
t.
The optimization problem each type solves is considered next. An adult agent i’s
preferences are represented in an additively separable form,
ui (ct,G t)=ui (ct)+γi
tυi (Gt), with i ∈ {a,b} and γi
t > 0,
where u(ct) and υ(Gt) are strictly concave, increasing functions satisfying u0 (0) =
υ0 (0) = ∞,a n dγi
t measures the relative weight of the utility from the public good.
As mentioned, a particular degree of CBI, Gt, entails at the same time a social cost,
i.e., some function Gt (·). In the CBI literature we quoted, this is usually an aggregate
cost to society which can come from several sources. One key source of this cost — to which
we limit attention here — comes from the redistribution (and, thus, inequality) inﬂation
induces within and across generations.13 Without loss of generality and following the huge
literature on the provision of public goods, the social cost of CBI is expressed further down
in terms of the private good c.
11The literature on the private provision of public goods allows a less restrictive setting where each
agent chooses his contribution, in units of the consumption good, and the resulting amount of the public
good equals the sum of all contributions. We leave this avenue for future research.
12Many studies have strongly emphasized such beneﬁts (Berger et al., 2001; Crowe and Meade, 2007),
so we avoid their discussion here, to focus on our point.
13Another source — which we do not model — could be related to a distortion of the Phillips curve
trade-oﬀ that causes the sacriﬁce ratio to increase at low levels of inﬂation (Akerlof et al., 1996; Benigno
and Ricci, 2010).
72.3.1 Inﬂation-Deﬂation Symmetry
We ﬁrst analyze the simplest, baseline version of our model, where inﬂation and deﬂation
are symmetrically treated in terms of their probability of occurring. This is the case when
the unconditional mean of the inﬂation-shock process is zero, με =0 ,14 although agents
do not know that. Hence, they would be learning the unconditional mean of inﬂation
by observing the available historical record, generation after generation, as we discussed.
Our baseline version, in eﬀect, rationalizes why partial private protection against inﬂation
may not necessarily be beneﬁcial, yet again agents cannot be sure about it; thus, one of
the types may not be (willingly) ‘passing on’ or ‘adopting’ any degree of partial private
protection against inﬂation via the endowment structure: this is implied by assuming, in
our baseline version here, that ϕa =0and ϕb = ϕ>0.
If the fraction qi
t,w i t h0 ≤ qi
t ≤ 1,o ft y p ei ∈ {a,b} individuals at time t is more than
a half, then qi
t >q
j
t, and the voting equilibrium degree of CBI solves the maximization




















































































t [ϕ  +
(1−ϕ) 
1+e πt ,γb
t], which corresponds to the preferred degree of CBI by type i agents
in any period t. It is a function of the common inﬂation forecast b πt and the type-speciﬁc
in-built protection against inﬂation ϕi and public-good weight γi
t. Plugging that optimal
degree of CBI back into the utility yields the value function. For type a agents, it is:
14Starting from initial inﬂation and CBI degree of zero, π−1 =0and G
∗
0 =0 : check the ALM (2).
15Note that the budget constraint that follows explicitly states a trade-oﬀ, usual in this literature,













































Because of the optimality of Ga∗
t (·) and the positivity of γa
t > 0,a sw e l la st h e














so that it is always in the interest of a type a mature agent to enjoy the public good,
here her particular, preferred degree of CBI, Ga∗
t (·).





















































Again, because of the optimality of Gb∗
t (·) and the positivity of γb
t > 0,a sw e l la st h e
















so that it is always in the interest of a type b mature agent as well to enjoy the public
good, here her particular, preferred degree of CBI, Gb∗
t (·).
However, the legislated degree of CBI each period is unique, as it is determined by the
dominant type of agents’ preferences via representation in parliament.
Proposition 1 (Endogenous Inﬂation Preferences with Costless Diﬀerential
Private Inﬂation Protection and Symmetry of Inﬂation and Deﬂation) In our
baseline model with costlessly adopted ϕb = ϕ>ϕ a =0and symmetry of inﬂation and
deﬂation (since με =0 ), a-types arise endogenously as more inﬂation-averse than b-types
in the sense of optimally supportin gah i g h e rd e g r e eo fp u b l i ci n ﬂation protection through
a higher degree of monetary control (proxied by CBI); equivalently, a-types arise endoge-
nously as less deﬂation-averse than b-types. Stated reversely: b-types arise endogenously
as more deﬂation-averse than a-types in the sense of optimally supporting a higher de-
gree of public deﬂation protection through a higher degree of monetary control (proxied by
CBI); equivalently, b-types arise endogenously as less inﬂation-averse than b-types.
9Proof. We proceed in three steps, each considering conditional inﬂation forecasts for
some particular period t given legislated G∗
t that are, respectively, (i) positive, b πt > 0,
(ii) negative, b πt < 0, or (iii) zero, b πt =0 .
(i) Under b πt > 0 (i.e., if inﬂation in the past has prevailed over deﬂation) we can write
the inequality




t <ϕ  +

































so that, from (6), we have:






















t > 0. (7)
That is, for b πt > 0, (7) derives that a-types are endogenously more inﬂation-averse than






(ii) Now under b πt < 0 (i.e., if deﬂation in the past has prevailed over inﬂation), the
above logic applies with reversed inequality signs everywhere, to lead to:























That is, for b πt < 0, (8) derives that b-types are endogenously more deﬂation-averse than






(iii) Finally, under b πt =0 ,t h et w ot y p e so fi n ﬂation preferences, a and b,w i l lnot






Proposition 1 can be interpreted in a straightforward way. The optimal degree of
publicly legislated monetary control over inﬂation/deﬂation (proxied by CBI plus con-
servatism) for each type that arises endogenously is shaped by the agent’s expected real
endowment over mature lifetime, which is in turn aﬀected by the conditionally expected
inﬂation or deﬂation and the degrees of private and public protection against inﬂation
or deﬂation. If agents forecast inﬂation/deﬂation unanimously and optimally, as in our
10set-up, given b πt > 0 (b πt < 0) a-types (b-types) will have a stronger preference for pub-
lic protection against inﬂation (deﬂation) by a monetary authority that enjoys a higher
degree of control in order to lower inﬂation (deﬂation) through its legislated mandate.
Analytically, the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) of private good consumption for
public good consumption across types implied by (7) and (8) diﬀer. Under (7), type a’s
MRS is higher, which is consistent with the higher degree of inﬂation aversion of this type,
than type b’s MRS for any t. Under (8), type a’s MRS is lower, which is again consistent
with the higher degree of inﬂation aversion of this type, than type b’s MRS for any t.
Corollary 1 (Unique Socially-Optimal Zero Inﬂation with Symmetry of In-
ﬂation and Deﬂation) In our baseline model, the unique socially-optimal (actual) in-
ﬂation/deﬂation rate, in the sense that it will not redistribute in terms of (ﬁnal) real
endowments (or wealth, more generally) across types, is zero: π∗
t =0 , ∀t.
Proof. Follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1, replacing everywhere b πt by
π∗
t =0 .
Note from (7), replacing everywhere b πt by πt, that any positive rate of inﬂation,
πt > 0, harms both agent types, but a-types more relative to b-types. Inversely, from
(8), any negative rate of inﬂation, i.e., deﬂation, πt < 0, beneﬁts again both agent types,
and again a-types more relative to b-types. Both agent types will be better-oﬀ under
any deﬂation rate relative to any inﬂation rate, reminiscent of the Friedman (1969) rule.
Yet only π∗
t =0makes the real endowments of both types equal (also equal to their
identical nominal endowments in any t), and thus eliminates the cause for the types being
distinct.16
To anticipate on the empirical application provided further down, one can think of the
retirees in a nation as types a who would seek protection of their pensions and (mostly
ﬁxed-income) savings from inﬂation (Gertler, 1999; Doepke and Schneider, 2006; Fuji-
wara and Teranishi, 2008) and thus support a higher degree of CBI (plus conservatism)
than the active working-age population, to be our proxy for types b. Following minor
adaptations, not pursued here, our model could accommodate alternative interpretations
of types a versus b as lenders versus borrowers or eﬀective opposition to inﬂa t i o nb yt h e
ﬁnancial sector versus other interest groups (Posen, 1995). Observe as well that, ignoring
the inequality eﬀects of redistribution by a non-zero price level change, the Friedman
(1969) rule of optimal (mild) deﬂation is generated by the baseline version of our model:
as we stated, (mild) deﬂation makes better-oﬀ both types in terms of real endowments
(wealth, more generally), but with a (minimal) redistribution cost in favor of types a.I n
fact, it is exactly such (potentially high) social redistribution cost that would prevent the
Friedman rule here, via socialization and voting as we discuss next, from being systemat-
16Of course, such a zero-inﬂation policy would be implementable only if an egalitarian monetary au-
thority enjoys a complete control over the inﬂation process and is not inﬂuenced by agents who vote on
its mandate according to their preference type. We would abstract in this paper from such an unrealistic
scenario.
11ically violated, in the sense of running away into exploding deﬂation (or inﬂation, if the
violation is in the opposite direction).
2.3.2 Inﬂa t i o nA v e r s i o nw i t hP o s i t i v eI n ﬂation Expectations
We now consider an extension of the presented baseline set-up where the observed history
implies positive inﬂation rates most of the time, as is the empirically relevant case. This
rationalizes why partial private protection against inﬂation, via ϕi > 0, would characterize
both types, and would be (willingly) ‘inherited’ and ‘passed on’. Moreover, our extended




> Φ(ϕa) > 0 for ϕb >ϕ a > 0, that are assumed predetermined for each
type (in the case we consider below) in addition to any (known) social costs G∗
t (·).17 We
introduce such costs here, and analyze next whether and how they modify the conclusions





Our extended model highlights the following modiﬁcations relative to the baseline set-
up. In the beginning of their mature life, having received the identical nominal endowment
 , agents ﬁrst make a (realistically, constrained) choice of how much to protect it against
expected inﬂation over their mature lifetime. However, this ‘investment’ (or ‘indexation’
or ‘diversiﬁcation’) decision regarding the ‘restructuring’ of their nominal portfolio is still
predetermined by their type.18 Since the particular type is again revealed at the end of
the socialization process operating during t−1, the two types are still distinct and opt for
diﬀerential private diversiﬁcation degrees and, hence, costs, over their mature lifetime in
t. To keep the analysis simple, we here model a binary (i.e., type-predetermined) choice
of ﬁxed-cost private inﬂation protection. If an individual is socialized as (i.e., revealed to
be of) type i,s h ec h o o s e st op a yaprivate ﬁxed cost Φi > 0 to get a (constant) fraction,
0 <ϕ i < 1, of her nominal (initial-period) endowment indexed (or otherwise privately
diversiﬁed) against inﬂation. Her real (ﬁnal-period and ‘privately selected’) endowment
is then
 iΦ





− Φi − G∗
t. (9)
Type b diﬀers in that she ‘chooses’ to pay a higher private cost Φb > Φa to get her
endowment indexed (or diversiﬁed) against inﬂation to a higher extent, ϕb >ϕ a.I n
eﬀect, all agents will turn out to value publicly legislated control over inﬂation by the
monetary authority, proxied by CBI, but each type will prefer a diﬀerent degree of CBI
again, which we show next. Types a thus place most of the task of safeguarding against





could be a monotonically increasing (but bounded — by wealth) function of the
respective degrees of private protection against inﬂation by type i.
18Summarizing human capital, risk aversion, inequality aversion, ﬂexibility of objectives and/or con-
straints, as we suggested.
12in our narrower interpretation), imposing an equal legislated social cost for everybody,
G∗
t;w h i l et y p e sb rely mostly on their own adopted or selected — but, again, predetermined
by socialization — indexation strategy, or lifetime portfolio diversiﬁcation behavior, in a
broader context,19 implying privately covered costs that diﬀer across types. In the rest of
the detail, the extended version remains the same as the presented baseline model.
In particular, our extended model sheds light on the endogenously arising socialization
eﬀort by type that drives the model dynamics to be discussed in section 3. To clarify this
point, we consider our next results.
Proposition 2 (Endogenous Inﬂation Aversion with Costly Diﬀerential Pri-
vate Inﬂation Protection and Positive Inﬂation Expectations) In our extended
model with (i) prevailing positive inﬂation expectations, b πt > 0 for most t =0 ,1,2...
(since με > 0), and (ii) ﬁxed costs of diﬀerential private inﬂation protection predeter-
mined by type, implied by Φb ≡ Φ
¡
ϕb¢
> Φ(ϕa) ≡ Φa > 0 for 1 >ϕ b >ϕ a > 0 and
driven by the outcome of socialization, a-types arise endogenously again as more high-
inﬂation-averse than b-types in the sense of optimally supporting a higher degree of public
inﬂation protection through a higher degree of monetary control (proxied by CBI).
Proof. Again, we proceed in three steps.
(i) Under prevailing positive conditional expectations of inﬂation we can follow the
logic of case (i) in the Proof of Proposition 1, adapting the anticipated endowments
accordingly to reﬂect the diﬀerential private costs. For the expected real endowments to
be equal, a particular inﬂation forecast b π∗
t must exist such that:
ϕa  +
(1 − ϕa) 
1+b π∗
t
− Φa − G∗










t = b π∗ =
Φb − Φa
(ϕa − ϕb)  +( Φb − Φa)
= const > 0.
Now, if b πt ≡ b πt,H > b π∗
t, we are in a case analogous to (i) in Proposition 1 and,
therefore,
ϕa  +
(1 − ϕa) 
1+b πt
− Φa − G∗















(1 − ϕa) 
1+b πt














19Given, of course, a particular depth and degree of ﬁnancial market development we do not model.
13and
υa0 (Ga∗






so that from (6), we have:
















ϕb  + (1−ϕb) 








That is, for b πt ≡ b πt,H > b π∗
t, a-types are endogenously more high-inﬂation-averse than
b-types.
(ii) If conversely b πt ≡ b πt,L < b π∗
t, we are in a case analogous to (ii) in Proposition 1
and, therefore,
ϕa  +
(1 − ϕa) 
1+b πt
− Φa − G∗





− Φb − G∗
t,
so that the above logic applies with reversed inequality signs everywhere, to lead to:
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That is, for b πt ≡ b πt,L < b π∗
t, b-types are endogenously more low-inﬂation-averse than
a-types: too low inﬂation makes them worse-oﬀ relative to the a-types, due to the higher
private costs of inﬂation protection of b-types over a-types.
(iii) Finally, under b πt ≤ 0, now with private costs of protection the two types of
inﬂation preferences, a and b, still endogenously arise, similarly to (ii) just above: b-types
would be losing relative to a-types in such periods and will be more deﬂation-averse.
To sum-up, the result in Proposition 2 concerning our extended model is analogous to
the result in Proposition 1 concerning our baseline: a-types are more high-inﬂation-averse
than b-types while b-types are more low-inﬂation and deﬂation-averse than a-types in the
extended model. In it, diﬀerential ﬁxed private costs of protection against inﬂation are
introduced, but the separation of the agents into paying the higher or the lower of the
costs is (still) predetermined by the socialization process that shapes out type adoption.
Another corollary is now in order that justiﬁes a particular positive rate of inﬂation
as socially-optimal in the extended set-up considered here.
Corollary 2 (Unique Socially-Optimal Positive Inﬂation with Positive Inﬂa-
tion Expectations) In our extended model, the unique socially-optimal (actual) inﬂation
rate, in the sense that it will not redistribute in terms of (ﬁnal) real endowments (or wealth,
more generally) across types, is positive: π∗
t = Φb−Φa
(ϕa−ϕb) +(Φb−Φa) = const > 0, ∀t.




2.3.3 Endogenous Socialization Eﬀort
We ﬁnally consider a mechanism that generates endogenous socialization eﬀo r tb yt y p ei n
a generalized version of the set-up we presented thus far that applies to both the baseline
and the extended models. Since agents do not know the true mean of the inﬂation process,
in each period t they update their common knowledge of its conditional mean through
historical observation. That is, actual inﬂation each period is πt = b πt + ηt ,w h e r eηt is
the forecast error and the common inﬂation forecast across types is b πt ≡ b μπ,t−1. The next
period inﬂation forecast then becomes b πt+1 ≡ b μπ,t, and so forth.
Conjecture 1 (Endogenous Socialization Eﬀort with Reference to Actual In-
ﬂation) Given the structure of the endowment of each type (ϕi) and the unanimous
conditional inﬂation forecast in any t (b πt) in both versions of the model (baseline and
extended), πt = b πt + ηt redistributes in a way that makes the type which loses more in
relative terms to the other type to socialize the next generation exerting more eﬀort,a n d
thus aﬀecting in a stronger way type adoption next period.
Conjecture 1 follows immediately from the logic of the framework we developed. How-
ever, imposing it as a behavioral assumption to endogenize socialization eﬀort would
require a very speciﬁc calibration of a number of parameters we are not immediately
interested in here, such as those determining π∗
t in Corollary 2. While this may be our
task in future research, the present paper seeks to provide a more general characterization
of endogenous socialization eﬀort in response to relative losses the two types experience
while updating the common knowledge of the conditional mean of the generational inﬂa-
tion process. One such convenient and minimally restrictive speciﬁcation of endogenizing
eﬀorts to socialize the next generation as agents learn through history that seems quite
appealing in our context, consistent with adaptive learning, is embodied in the second
conjecture we make.
Conjecture 2 (Endogenous Socialization Eﬀort with Reference to Updating
the Conditional Mean of Inﬂation) Given the structure of the endowment of each
type (ϕi) and the unanimous conditional inﬂation forecast in any t (b πt) in both versions
of the model (baseline and extended), if πt > b πt leading to b πt+1 − b πt > 0, a-types lose
more from the positive ‘surprise generational inﬂation’ and socialize stronger relative to
b-types; and vice versa, if πt < b πt leading to b πt+1 − b πt < 0, b-types lose more from the
negative ‘surprise generational inﬂation’ and socialize stronger relative to a-types.
The behavioral mechanism we assume in the second conjecture also ﬁts well our the-
oretical framework. Moreover, its direct purpose is to facilitate the simulation of the
model generating its longer-run dynamics we discuss in the next section. In particular,
15our implementation of the reported simulation results further down is consistent with
Conjecture 2.
3 Intergenerational Dynamics of Preferences and Institu-
tions
We continue our analysis focusing next on inﬂation preference transmission across gener-
ations.
3.1 Preference Transmission through Imperfect Empathy
Children are born without well-deﬁned preferences, but acquire them through observation,
imitation and adoption of ‘cultural models’ with which they are matched. This matching,
termed ‘socialization’, naturally comes in two steps and is inﬂuenced to some extent by
economic choices, but also by parents. Children are ﬁrst exposed to their parents model
(type a or b), and are thus ‘matched’ with their family, in what is termed ‘direct vertical
transmission’. If they do not adopt their parent’s trait, they are then exposed to the
inﬂuence of other individuals of the old generation (e.g., teachers, peers, role models)
and adopt the preference type of some among these, i.e., ‘oblique vertical transmission’.20
Imperfect empathy, a particular form of myopia we assume throughout the paper, further
implies that parents always want to socialize their children to their own preferences and
cultural traits.21
To examine the mechanism driving the intergenerational transmission of inﬂation
aversion through the socialization channel we assume that a child adopts his parent’s
preferences with an endogenous probability τi (·),t ob em a d em o r ep r e c i s el a t e r ,w i t h
0 ≤ τi (·) ≤ 1, i ∈ {a,b}. If not, with probability 1 − τi (·), the child is then matched
randomly with another individual of the old generation and adopts her preference type.
The transition probabilities at time t, P
ij
t , that a parent of type i has a child adopting
ap r e f e r e n c eo ft y p ej are then:
Paa
t = τa (·)+( 1− τa (·))qa
t ,
Pab
t =( 1 − τa (·))(1 − qa
t ),
Pbb
t = τb (·)+
³
1 − τb (·)
´
qb
t = τb (·)+
³


















20This terminology originates in the anthropological and psychological literature and was introduced
by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). ‘Horizontal transmission’, which we do not model, occurs within
ag e n e r a t i o n .
21Imperfect empathy is a common assumption in the emerging socialization literature within economics.
It implies that parents can perceive the welfare of their children only through the ﬁlter of their own
preferences.
16Given these transition probabilities, the fraction qa
t of adult individuals of type a in
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It is clear that the fraction of type-a agents in the old generation may stay constant
across time only if the term in square brackets is equal to 1. This would occur if either
(i) qa
t =1or (ii) τa (·)=τb (·) or (iii) both. However, case (i) — and, hence, case
(iii) — is excluded by assumption for the initial condition (0 <q a
t < 1), as otherwise a
stable structure of the mature population preferences emerges, in which the initial type of
preferences perpetuates forever. Therefore, only case (ii) remains as a potentially relevant,
symmetric option to consider; yet, it deﬁnes a steady state for any initial condition,
without any evolution of the relative proportions of preferences in the society, and so is
uninteresting for economic purposes.
In all other cases, diﬀerent from (i), (ii) and (iii), the intergenerational dynamics
of preferences depends on two factors: ﬁrst, the proportion of type-a agents inherited
from past history, qa
t ,r e l a t i v et oqb
t; second, the sign of the diﬀerence of the vertical
transmission probabilities, τa (·) − τb (·), which determines the direction of preference










τa (·) − τb (·)
´
(10)
delivers a ﬁrst-order non-linear sequence, which does not admit any general solution
even for constant τa and τb.
3.2 Deterministic Benchmarks
Before proceeding with completing the description of our model and the discussion of
the key insights from its simulations, we now summarize the more restrictive and simpler
cases the emerging literature on preference transmission has mostly considered.
3.2.1 Exogenous Vertical Preference Transmission
With exogenous constants τa and τb,t h el a wo fm o t i o no fa-types as a fraction in the













17Given the standard assumptions with regard to probabilities (as above), namely that
τa and τb are both between 0 and 1, we know that the stability points of this function
are 0 and 1.22 The conditions for convergence then with exogenously constant vertical
transmission probabilities τa and τb are obvious:
• If τa <τ b, then for any initial condition qa
0, qa
t→∞ → 0: social preferences will
converge towards an economy with only type-b agents, i.e., a lower degree of CBI.
• If τa >τ b, then for any initial condition qa
0, qa
t→∞ → 1: social preferences will
converge towards an economy with only type-a agents, i.e., a higher degree of CBI.
Since by the initial condition of preference heterogeneity, 0 <q a
0 < 1, no case can
be ruled out, convergence in this deterministic exogenous preference dynamics equation,
(11), will depend on the relative size of τa and τb. To illustrate this result, we present
phase diagrams for the two opposite cases. As can be seen in Figure 2, if the sign of the
vertical preference transmission probability diﬀerential between types a and b, τa −τb,i s
positive, then the intergenerational dynamics of the fraction of preference type a converges
to the steady state S with coordinates (1,1) for any initial condition qa
0. The process is
driven by the concavity of the phase diagram curves, drawn for diﬀerent magnitudes
of the mentioned probability diﬀerential. This leads to an ultimate adoption of type a
agents’ preferences — which is the only preference type to survive, while the other type
is extinguished. Conversely, Figure 3 shows that if the probability diﬀerential τa − τb is
negative, then the preferences of society converge to type b at the steady state S0 with
coordinates (0,0) for any initial condition qa
0.T h econvexity of the phase diagram curves
in this case directs convergence to an ultimate equilibrium where only type b survives.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
Interestingly, the speed of the preference convergence process depends on (the absolute
value of) the magnitude of the vertical preference transmission probability diﬀerential,
itself determining the curvature of the path of the fraction of type-a preferences in our
two phase diagrams. The larger (the modulus of) this diﬀerential (e.g., compare the
graphs for 0.9 versus 0.1 in Figure 2 and for −0.9 versus −0.1 in Figure 3), the more
curved the path and the quicker the convergence process.
3.2.2 Endogenous Vertical Preference Transmission
Diﬀerently from the situations depicted in ﬁgures 2 and 3, real-world heterogeneity of
beliefs and norms of behavior does not seem to necessarily exhibit such convergence to
an ultimate survival of one of the types, with the others extinguished (as in evolutionary
22In the case of exogenous constants τ
a and τ
b, our preference transmission model is the logistic map.






t and r =1+τ; then equation (11) becomes xt+1 = rxt (1 − xt). The logistic
map is well understood (at least in the range 0 ≤ r ≤ 2, which is implied by 0 ≤ τ
i ≤ 1): here, the known
behavior is equivalent to what we assert about the q
i
t processes.
18selection mechanisms). Instead, an equilibrium where diﬀerent types of preferences coexist
would rather be sustained. Certain conditions on the transmission mechanism that induce
heterogeneity in the long-run stationary distribution of preferences in the population have
been examined by Bisin and Verdier (2001). However, in their set-up this analysis comes
at the cost of imposing ‘cultural substitution’ (as in Sáez-Martí and Sjögren, 2008, too),
which may be restrictive. Cultural substitution means that the vertical socialization
of children inside the family and outside the family act as substitutes in the cultural
transmission mechanism. Then, there can exist a heterogeneous distribution of preferences
in the population which is globally stable. Intuitively, direct transmission acts as a cultural
substitute for oblique transmission when parents have less incentives to socialize their
children once their own values are widely dominant in the population.
We could have assumed cultural substitution too: the probability of direct vertical
socialization to the parent’s trait i, τi, will be a negative function of the attained level of
t h ef r a c t i o ni nt h ep o p u l a t i o nw i t ht h a ts a m et r a i t ,qi



























In our context, equation (12) will have the same consequences as in the quoted papers,
i . e . ,c o n v e r g i n gt oa ninterior equilibrium. However, we have argued in section 2 that
inﬂation preferences could more realistically be thought of as a gradual outcome of past-
and own-generation experience with inﬂation, accordingly modulating socialization eﬀort
and modifying inherited monetary institutions. This leads us to address next nondeter-
ministic environments where learning from history consistent with our theoretical results
in section 2 drives the transmission of preferences and institutional change.
3.3 Stochastic Endogenous Socialization under Learning
Allowing for a richer dynamics requires to endogenize the direct vertical transmission
of preferences in a stochastic extension of the standard deterministic socialization set-
up just described, also linking it with the low-frequency inﬂation dynamics equation
(2).23 Combining features we already discussed but keeping the model as straightforward
as possible given our objective, we now complete it by incorporating several relevant
features.24
23A detailed description of our simulation results as well as of some further empirical ﬁndings is provided
i nas u p p l e m e n t a r ya p p e n d i x .O u rc o d e sa n dd a t as e ta r ea l s oa v a i l a b l ea sa* . z i p xa r c h i v e .
24Note that we consider further below immediately the endogenous stochastic dynamics case, where
socialization responds to observed inﬂation given the legislated CBI and the redistributive loss relative to
the other type. An exploration of the exogenous stochastic dynamics case would imply to specify stochastic
processes for the probabilities of vertical transmission (τ
i
t). Assuming them random variables, e.g., draws
from uniform (0,1) independent distributions each period in the simplest context, would lead one to























0 generate ultimate convergence to either of the types, as in the deterministic exogenous





19First, and in line with Conjecture 1, we now assume that the probability of vertical
socialization to the parent’s trait i, τi
t, is a positive function of the eﬀort at time t the

















Second, in line with Proposition 2 and under its simpliﬁcation in Conjecture 2, we
assume that socialization eﬀorts, ei
t, are, in turn, a positive function of the change in
the conditional mean of inﬂation (b πt − b πt−1) a particular generation t observes over its
adulthood, i.e., therefore a function of cumulative historical record up through t.T h u s ,
implementing Conjecture 2, we write: ei
t (b πt − b πt−1,·),w i t h
∂ea
t (e πt−e πt−1,·)
∂(e πt−e πt−1) > 0 if b πt−b πt−1 >
0,( a sa types are worse-oﬀ in such a case than b types, and would require more protection
against inﬂation via a higher legislated degree of CBI next period, G∗
t+1 >G ∗
t)w h i l e
∂eb
t(e πt−e πt−1,·)
∂(e πt−e πt−1) > 0 if b πt − b πt−1 < 0 (as b types are worse-oﬀ in such a case than a types,
and would require less protection against relatively high inﬂation via a lower degree of
CBI, G∗
t+1 <G ∗
t). That is, types a react to an observed rise in the conditional mean of
lifetime inﬂation by increasing their socialization eﬀorts, while types b react to an observed
fall in the conditional mean of lifetime inﬂation by increasing their socialization eﬀorts.
Accordingly, we now distinguish a second channel of transmitting inﬂation preferences by
the adult generation to the young which is always operative through socialization during
any t,v i aei
t (b πt,−b πt−1·), in addition to the institutionalization channel which operates
through voting in the beginning of each t,v i aG∗
t, and, therefore, only when majorities
shift.
Third, to simplify the simulations, we assume χa =1and χb =0 .5 so that G∗a
t = b πt
and G∗b
t =0 .5b πt =0 .5G∗a
t in (2), with the initial condition for inﬂation being π0 = με.T h e
latter initialization implies that those of the alternative simulation cases where the mean
of the inﬂa t i o ns h o c ki sa s s u m e dz e r o ,με =0 , eliminate (by construction in the codes,
as above) the drift term in the low-frequency AR(1) stochastic process for inﬂation and,
thus, the feedback from the CBI (or institutional) channel.25 Our assumption here linking
the degree of monetary control G∗a
t or G∗b
t to the observed conditional mean b πt bears some
realism and intuitive power, in the sense that each agent type will have some idea of the
order of magnitude to which the monetary authority will be able to aﬀect actual inﬂation
πt over t via the law of motion (2). Moreover, as generations learn (asymptotically) from
historical experience the unconditional mean of inﬂation, the control over actual inﬂation
(asymptotically) increases too.





















Equations (2) and (13) thus form an interdependent recursive dynamic system in two
25Exploring also π0 = με =0(and σ
2
ε =1 ) is done on purpose, as it allows direct comparison with the
analogous simulation cases that diﬀer only in that π0 = με =2(and σ
2
ε =1 , again). Note that in the
former case inﬂation becomes an AR(1) stochastic process without the institutional drift inﬂuence, but
not in the latter case.
20state variables, πt and qa
t+1. They also highlight the two channels through which societies
transmit values and institutions from a generation to the next, institutionalization and
socialization, respectively. Starting from some initial conditions π0 and qa
0, implying also
a corresponding initial value for Gi∗
0 , the shock realization ε1 gives π1 from (2); from
(13), then, b π1 − b π0,w i l lﬁrst impact the socialization eﬀort across types, next the pref-
erence transmission probabilities, and ultimately qa
1;a ns oo na n ds of o r t hi ns u b s e q u e n t
periods. This chain of eﬀects constitutes the mechanism generating irregular cycles of
temporary convergence towards one trait in the population or the other. For example, if





t−1 (b πt−1 − b πt−2,·),·
¤
) will have taken place in t − 1, increasing the degree
of inﬂation aversion in the population (qa
t ) and, potentially (i.e., if the majority type has
shifted), of CBI too (Ga∗
t ) when voting at the beginning of t. The present-period adult
generation in t may thus feel more insulated from the eﬀects of high inﬂation via the
increased CBI, and its eﬀort (ea
t (b πt − b πt−1,·)) to socialize their own children (to stronger
inﬂation aversion) is more likely to be reduced insofar the higher Ga∗
t acts to reduce actual
inﬂation for any given realization of the inﬂation shock in t, via (2). A period of con-
vergence away from the high inﬂation aversion the preceding generation had built (and
potentially transformed in inﬂation-proof institutions) could then follow. Hence, prefer-
ence shift cycles can arise and reverse each other, as illustrated next by a summary of our
simulations.26
To explore further this mechanism, we simulated our dynamic model embodied in the
recursive system (2) and (13) over 1000 periods under alternative parameters and shock
processes. Our simulations concerning inﬂation dynamics assumed, alternatively, 3 cases:
1. π0 =0 %=με and σ2
ε =1 , i.e., a zero-mean inﬂation regime, or one consistent with
zero-inﬂation steady states in theoretical models;
2. π0 =2 %=με and σ2
ε =1 , i.e., a low-inﬂation regime, or one broadly typical for
advanced economies over the most recent generation span; and
3. π0 =6 %=με and σ2
ε =3(all these 3 parameters 3 times higher than in case 2), i.e.,
a high-inﬂation regime with higher volatility, or one broadly typical for emerging
markets over the most recent generation span.
Moreover, all 3 cases were simulated for 3 alternative (constant) values of the para-
meter measuring low-frequency inﬂation persistence,27 ρ = {0.1,0.5,0.9},a n df o r3e n -




t(b πt−b πt−1,·), ·]| =
26Note that ‘nature’ also plays a role in the dynamics of the system, by ‘drawing’ the inﬂation shock every
period. Observe as well that the control society has over nature is necesarily imperfect, operating along
both transmission channels only in addition to the draw of nature. While this is certainly a simpliﬁcation,
it captures the main features of endogenous preferences and institutions we highlight here as emerging
through learning from history.
27Note that in our context persistence of the inﬂation process at (mature) generation spans (t of the
order of 25-30 years) may not necessarily correspond to measured short-run (annual or quarterly t)i n ﬂation
persistence in the abundant literature. Also, ρ → 0 captures a normal stochastic process for inﬂation with
21{0.1,0.2,0.5}, translating the reaction to observed variation in the conditional mean of
generational inﬂation into corresponding socialization eﬀort and, ultimately, probability
diﬀerential of passing over the parent’s trait to the child across the two types.28 The
magnitude of this diﬀerential is thus discretized in the simulations into 3 cases, namely:
an absolute value of 0.1 (obtained as in footnote 28) captures the case of a low endoge-
nous vertical probability diﬀerential, an absolute value of 0.2 (obtained analogously from
probabilities of 0.6 and 0.4) accounts for an intermediate case, and an absolute value
of 0.5 (obtained from probabilities of 0.75 and 0.25) features a high vertical probability
diﬀerential.
To put it brieﬂy, our model simulations point to the following conclusions.29 First,
whenever the resulting vertical transmission probability diﬀerential,
¯ ¯ ¯τa
t [ea




t (b πt − b πt−1,·),·
i¯ ¯ ¯,
is suﬃciently high — of the order of 0.5 or more, convergence occurs to one of the types
relatively quickly (sometimes in less than 10 generations). This conclusion remains valid
even when starting from an equal initial share in the population, qa
0 =0 .5±. The pattern
of convergence to one of the types also occurred, but typically somewhat slower, when
simulating the purely stochastic exogenous τi
t’s (as mentioned earlier in footnote 24).
Second, the main insight from the simulations highlights the possibility of irregular
preference shift cycles, manifested in a sequence of interior values for the fraction of types
which does not converge to any of the two corner steady states, even sometimes after 1000
generations, as illustrated in many ﬁgures of our supplement. The conditions which lead
to such dynamics are the following two: (i) the endogenous vertical probability diﬀerential
should be relatively low (about or less than 0.1 or 0.2 in absolute value); and (ii) the initial
fraction should be close to the mid-point, qa
0 ≈ qb
0.T h eﬁrst condition appears to be the
more inﬂuential one, unless the fractions of types are too distant. The second condition is
of interest as it potentially facilitates reversals at irregular intervals in the voted degree of
CBI too, that is, when the institutionalization channel is also operative, in addition to the
socialization channel. For that particular reason we illustrate the ﬂavor of our simulation
results selecting exactly the case of qa
0 =0 .5+ in the supplement.
Hence, as the simulations conﬁrmed, our mechanism of endogenous preference trans-
mission in a stochastic set-up where generations learn and adapt provides an alternative
(under certain parametrizations) to the assumption of cultural substitution. Interior equi-
libria with both types perpetuating across time (and not vanishing) were generated by
drift, while with ρ → 1 it approaches random walk with drift. Thus, while modeled and simulated as
a stochastic AR(1) with drift, our low-frequency inﬂation dynamics is rather general though remaining
simple.
28The simulations also assume a symmetric socialization eﬀort by the two types, in the sense that,
for example, when τ
a
t (·)=0 .55 and τ
b
t (·)=0 .45 after an observed increase in the conditional mean
of inﬂation, then τ
b
t (·)=0 .55 and τ
a
t (·)=0 .45 after an observed decrease in the conditional mean












t (πt − πt−1,·),·
  =0 .1.
29The ﬁgures collected in the supplementary appendix summarize our most interesting results.
22explicitly modeling the response of parents in their socialization eﬀort to the change in
the conditional mean of inﬂation they have observed. The extension of the Bisin—Verdier
(2001) — Sáez-Martí—Sjögren (2008) framework along such lines we provided appears es-
sential and insightful, as well as consistent with the model we proposed in section 2. Our
theoretical contribution to the literature thus consists in showing how the endogenous
transmission of inﬂation preferences and monetary institutions in a stochastic economic
environment can be understood as a process of intergenerational learning from history.
4 Empirical Evidence
The theory we developed and simulated thus far highlights a key determinant of the long-
run evolution of inﬂation aversion. It is the proportion (qa
t )o fm o r ei n ﬂation-averse
(type-a) agents relative to the proportion (qb
t)o fl e s si n ﬂation-averse (type-b) agents
in the population. qa
t and qb
t evolve across generations driven by socialization eﬀorts
(τa
t [ea




t (b πt − b πt−1,·),·
¤
) of parents with respect to their chil-
dren and by institutional amendments that constrain policies (when agents vote to imple-
ment their preferences, Ga∗
t or Gb∗
t ). We showed that both these preference transmission
channels, socialization and institutionalization, can be thought of as ultimately shaped
out by generational learning from inﬂation history, whereby each generation updates the
conditional mean of the low-frequency inﬂation process (b πt).
4.1 Measuring Inﬂation Aversion
Inﬂation aversion data spanning generation-long periods are not available. We thus have
to resort to cross-section estimates in assessing the impact of the determinants of inﬂation
aversion highlighted by our theory.
Our measure of inﬂation aversion is based on the International Social Survey Program
(ISSP) conducted by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research,
which collects nationally representative data in a way that is comparable across coun-
tries. We employ the 2006 wave, the latest, of the survey on the role of government in
society (Role of Government, wave IV, hereafter RoG IV). It provides us with a sample
of 33 countries and a corresponding database containing answers to questionnaires from
individuals. To measure inﬂation aversion, we rely on the following question (7b): On
the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s responsibility to keep
prices under control? The six categories of answers proposed to the respondents are:
‘deﬁnitely should be’, ‘probably should be’, ‘probably should not be’, ‘deﬁnitely should
not be’, ‘can’t choose’ and ‘no answer’.30 We use hereafter the sum of the percentage
30Unfortunately, the ISSP RoG 2006 (as well as earlier) surveys do not contain any questions regarding
central banks. We, therefore, had to consider the government and the central bank (in each of the countries
in our sample) as constituting the same public-sector macroeconomic — monetary, in particular — authority.
While it is true that the intertemporal public-sector budget constraint would include both institutions
as its aggregate (or consolidated) unit of relevance, we acknowledge the potential limitations of such an
interpretation.
23shares of the ﬁrst two categories as our new measure of a country’s degree of inﬂation
aversion employed in the regressions. We, in eﬀect, have constructed a survey-based proxy
of ‘absolute’ inﬂation aversion in the population, which is diﬀerent from the few other
measures one can ﬁnd in the literature.31
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 collects descriptive statistics concerning our measure of absolute inﬂation
aversion. A striking ﬁnding is that all countries in the ISSP RoG IV sample are highly
inﬂation-averse. On average, 86.4% of the respondents reply that governments should
deﬁnitely or probably control prices. The countries are almost equally distributed in the
three upper quartiles, with the standard deviation for the whole sample being 8.3,o r10%
of the average, a signiﬁcant degree of variation which deserves to be explained.
4.2 Explaining Inﬂation Aversion
As Shiller (1997) notes, even more important than the international diﬀerences in inﬂation
aversion are the intergenerational ones. Since the 1960s, demographic changes have been
tremendous, as a large generation of baby-boomers is now entering into its retirement pe-
riod. Such an intergenerational preference shift could have remained unnoticeable except
for the size of this aging group within the current adult generation, which has enabled
baby-boomers to translate their preferences into policies (see, e.g., Farvaque et al., 2010,
for related evidence on the reduction in inﬂation). Thus, an obvious candidate to proxy
type-a agents in our model is the share of retirees in the mature population, while the
working age people could be our proxy for type-b agents in the mature population. We
examined how retirees and workers responded to the ISSP 2006 RoG IV question 7b.
Comparing the responses by these two categories of the adult generation conﬁrmed that
retirees are, generally across our sample, more inﬂation-averse than people of working
age. Therefore, a ﬁrst long-run determinant of the degree of inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni no u r
cross-sectional empirical tests of the theory is the proportion of retirees in the popula-
tion. As one check for robustness, we employ both the share of retirees (i.e., our proxy for
qa
t ) and the ratio of the share of retirees to the share of working age population (qa
t /qb
t)
in alternative speciﬁcations. These variables, to serve as the regressor of main interest,
summarize the preference structure of the theoretical economy described in the preceding
sections.
In the model as well as in real life, evolving inﬂation aversion perceptions across
generations can be translated, and should have been largely embodied, into the degree of
31Scheve (2004) and Jayadev (2006) have also analyzed data from the ISSP, but from the preceding
wave (ISSP RoG III, run in 1996). They both made use of a measure of ‘relative’ inﬂation aversion,
e m p l o y i n gad i ﬀerent question, where respondents were asked if the government’s priority should be to
ﬁg h tu n e m p l o y m e n to ri n ﬂation. Another available measure of inﬂation aversion is an index constructed
by Krause and Méndez (2005) and employed in Krause and Méndez (2008) for 34 countries over a period
of 24 years. Their index is also deﬁned as a relative degree of inﬂation aversion, and it aims at revealing
policymakers’ preferences. It measures the weight a policymaker puts on inﬂation stabilization in an
objective function optimized under short-term (i.e., business-cycle like) constraints.
24CBI a nation has instituted at any particular period of its history. And here is where the
key implications of our OLG set-up allow a test of the theory in the available ISSP RoG IV
cross-section of 33 countries, representing regional and socioeconomic types from all over
the world. Moreover, during the last two decades at least, granting more independence
to the monetary authority from the government has been econometrically shown to bear
strongly on inﬂation (see, among others, Brumm, 2002, and de Haan and Klomp, 2008).
Following such theoretical and empirical results and capturing our institutionalization
channel of preference transmission, we include in the control set an index of CBI. Since
our data on inﬂation aversion is from 2006, we opt for the CBI index computed by Arnone
et al. (2009) for 2003, the closest available year.
Yet, our cross-section also includes emerging markets. In these countries, studies on
CBI have consistently shown that indexes based on legal aspects are not always statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. To deal with this issue, the literature generally makes use of the turnover
of central bankers (see, for example, Dreher et al., 2008). Employing such a proxy in our
framework would however be orthogonal, since turnover ratios are by deﬁnition related
to short-term issues.32 Hence, to account for the fact that the rule of law is as important
as the legal independence of the central bank, we include a measure of the protection of
property rights, developed by the Heritage Foundation and now regularly considered as
a reliable way to capture the respect for the law (see, for example, La Porta et al., 2004).
Finally, to proxy the socialization channel in our model which would also operate
through transmitting the impact of recent generation experiences — in particular, with
high inﬂation, we add to the regressors a dummy. It equals 1 when episodes of hyper- or
high inﬂation have been known in the 20th century, using the classiﬁcation in Fischer et
al. (2002).
Consequently, our benchmark cross-section equation is of the form:
InﬂAverst = α + βRetireest + γHighInﬂDumt + δCBI t + ηPropRst +  t.
InﬂAvers is our measure of a nation’s degree of (absolute) inﬂation aversion, and
Retirees is the share of retirees in the population or — depending on the regression speci-
ﬁcation — the ratio of the share of retirees to the share of working age population. High-
InﬂDum is the dummy representing past (high) inﬂation experiences, CBI is the CBI
index, PropRs stands for the property rights index, and   is the error term. The equation
is estimated by weighted least squares (WLS). WLS is a natural choice since our ISSP
2006 RoG IV sample includes countries as small as Ireland or Slovenia and as big as the
US, Japan or Russia, in terms of both population and real GDP (which we choose as our
two alternative weighting vectors). In the regressions weighted by the population, we also
controlled for the eﬀect of the country being richer or poorer, by employing the real GDP
per capita, RGDPpct, for 2004 (from the World Penn Tables 6.2, see Heston et al., 2006).
32Nevertheless, robustness checks using such a measure found it not statistically signiﬁcant in our sample
(see below).
25[Figure 4 about here]
We performed the usual diagnostics tests involving the residuals from the regressions.
In particular, we experimented as well with OLS, and analyzed the residuals of both the
OLS and WLS regressions. This is documented in Figure 4 for one of our main speciﬁ-
cations (namely, 1.1 in Table 2 further down). It is clear from the OLS residual plot and
histogram (upper panels in Figure 4) that the OLS residuals manifest heteroskedasticity
as well as non-normality. Since large residuals were, roughly, inversely proportional to
population size (evident also in the plots), we ﬁrst conjectured that the heteroskedasticity
we were dealing with was of such known form. This induced us to rely on WLS instead of
OLS. While the WLS residuals still displayed heteroskedasticity, the Jarque-Bera test (see
the bottom right histogram in Figure 4) could not reject their normality. However, the
results from formal White tests for the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form
were inconclusive with respect to both the OLS and WLS residuals in most of our var-
ious speciﬁcations. We therefore implemented further estimation with White correction
for heteroskedasticity of unknown form in our WLS regressions under both alternative
weighting schemes.
The benchmark results from our estimation are presented in Table 2. The weighting
vector consists of the respective population by country, data for 2004 (from the World
Penn Tables 6.2, see Heston et al., 2006).
[Table 2 about here]
To better capture the model’s two degrees of inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni nac o m p a c tf o r m
(type-a preferences relative to type-b preferences), regression 1.1 uses the ratio of the
share of retirees to the share of workers as the key regressor of interest. The controls
include real GDP per capita, the high inﬂation dummy, the CBI index, and the property
rights index. All variables and the intercept are statistically signiﬁcant: real GDP per
capita at the 10% level, the property rights index at the 5% level, the remaining three
regressors and the constant at the 1% level. Furthermore, all have signs in conformity
with theoretical expectations, and the explanatory power of the regression is very high.
Our theory is empirically corroborated, as the higher the share of retirees relative to
the working age population, the higher is a country’s inﬂation aversion. As expected, it
turns out that historical experience with high inﬂation (our dummy) negatively impacts
current inﬂation aversion. That is, high inﬂation in the past leads the contemporaneous
generation to take steps (through socialization of their children and possibly also through
institution-building by majority voting) to avoid returning to such a damaging path.33
Consequently, the current generation (their children) feels institutionally more protected
from inﬂation, and their inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni sr e d u c e d . T h i si sc o n ﬁrmed as well by the
33To check robustness, we also ran the regressions substituting the high inﬂation dummy of Fischer et
al. (2002) with two alternative high inﬂation dummies. They were constructed as 2- and 3-digit recent 15-
year average of inﬂation. Our estimates showed very similar results in terms of the statistical signiﬁcance,
signs and even magnitudes of the coeﬃcients for all included variables (as those reported in Table 2).
26negative sign of the CBI index coeﬃcient, showing that higher CBI reduces a nation’s
inﬂation aversion. We again interpret this in the sense of our theoretical model that when
agents are protected by a higher degree of institutionalized CBI, they feel less threatened
by inﬂation and are thus less wary of it.34
To check for the potential joint importance of socialization, as captured by the high
inﬂation dummy, and institutionalization, being enshrined in the indexes for CBI or the
rule of law, we interacted all possible combinations of these three regressors. We could
not obtain statistical signiﬁcance of such product terms most of the time, which we
illustrate by the ﬁndings in regression 1.2. The justiﬁcation for experimenting with these
interaction terms in the regressions arises from the following causality, also implied by
our theoretical model. If a country experiences high inﬂa t i o n ,t h ed e g r e eo fas o c i e t y ’ s
inﬂation aversion will increase, as b-types (less inﬂation-averse) switch to a-types (more
inﬂation-averse). I.e., up to this point, it is only the socialization channel of preference
transmission that operates, and this channel is always eﬀective. Once such changes in
the structure of aggregate preferences surpass a particular critical mass, the median voter
in the model, simple voting majority obtains: only now the institutionalization channel
becomes eﬀective too, and if the a-types have not been able to enshrine legally their
preferences in earlier generations, they do it at this point in time. The degree of CBI
institutionalized by a-types then remains valid until the opposite change of majority, in
case this happens (sooner or later) in the future. Meanwhile, this higher (type a preferred)
degree of inﬂation aversion built-in into the current law acts also as an ‘insurance device’
against excessive actual inﬂation, possibly decreasing the socialization eﬀort of a-types.
One minor inconvenience of regressions 1.1 and 1.2 is that we cannot obtain a more
precise, quantitative interpretation concerning the marginal eﬀect of the more inﬂation-
averse type (type-a, as per our theory) on the degree of a society’s inﬂation aversion. To
be able to judge about that, as well as to check robustness, we proceed to regression 1.3
by considering separately the shares of the retirees and the working age population, and
not their ratio. This speciﬁcation highlights two insightful results. First, it is the share of
retirees that remains statistically signiﬁcant in determining inﬂation aversion, but not the
share of the working age population. This is not much surprising given the predictions of
our model as well as the demographic evolutions the world has known in the last decades.
Second, we can now see that an increase of one percentage point in the share of retirees
leads to an increase of almost half percentage point (to be precise, 42 basis points) in the
degree of inﬂation aversion, ceteris paribus. This is a very strong marginal impact, much
stronger than the comparable (being share-measured variables) marginal impact — in the
34To address another limitation of our data arising from potential skepticism of private agents about the
goverment stabilizing prices, we constructed an index of the degree of trust in the government, making
use — for consistency — of survey responses collected from the same data source, the ISSP RoG 2006.
We aggregated the % of the responses within the top two categories from question 17 in this survey: In
your opinion, about how many politicians in [Country] are involved in corruption?, with the following
possibilities: “almost none; a few; some; quite a lot; almost all; can’t choose”. We then ran regressions
adding this government trust index to our explanatory variables in Table 2. The added measure of trust
in the government did not appear as statistically signiﬁcant.
27opposite, negative direction — of the CBI index (of about −15 basis points). Regression
1.4 ﬁnally adds the same interaction term as in regression 1.2, which — again — is not
signiﬁcant.
To check robustness, we altered the weighting vector, using real GDP instead of popu-
lation. In this second weighting scheme we also had to omit one of the controls in the ﬁrst
weighting scheme, namely, real GDP per capita, to avoid potential inference problems
with the used weights. Insofar this variable showed up as signiﬁcant, but with practi-
cally zero coeﬃcient in the preceding set of results, such an omission does not weaken
the estimation. Table 3 shows the results from the WLS implementation with real GDP
weighting.
[Table 3 about here]
As can be seen from the table, the change in the weighting vector does not aﬀect in
a n yi m p o r t a n tw a yo u rﬁndings, neither qualitatively nor quantitatively. Again, adding
the interaction term for the combined eﬀect of the high inﬂation dummy and the CBI
i n d e xi ns p e c i ﬁcation 2.2 does not strengthen the regression output.
Speciﬁcations 2.3 and 2.4 in Table 3 conﬁrm the two important ﬁndings of the analo-
gous regressions, 1.3 and 1.4, in Table 2. First, the share of retirees remains statistically
signiﬁcant in determining inﬂation aversion, but not the share of the working age popu-
lation. And, second, an increase of one percentage point in the share of retirees leads to
an increase of (a bit higher or lower than) half percentage point in the degree of inﬂation
aversion, ceteris paribus. Thus, the marginal impact of the share of retirees on the degree
of a society’s inﬂation aversion comes out as even slightly stronger in magnitude when
using real GDP weights instead of population weights. Moreover, it also remains about
three times higher (in absolute value) than the comparable (statistically signiﬁcant) eﬀect
of the CBI index (of about −13 basis points).
[Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 about here]
In further robustness checks, we ran a few modiﬁcations of our regressions 1.1 and 1.3,
presented in tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. First, given our model assumption (supported by the
dominant evidence) that actual inﬂation tends to be negatively correlated with CBI, one
competing interpretation of the negative correlation between the CBI index and inﬂation
aversion we robustly found could be that recent inﬂation and inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o nm a yb e
themselves positively correlated. Moreover, survey respondents may have the current
inﬂation in mind, which could aﬀect the measure of inﬂation aversion. In order to test
such alternative interpretations, we replaced the CBI index with recent average inﬂation,
measured as the mean annual rate of CPI inﬂa t i o ni nt h eﬁve-year period up to and
including 2006, the year of the wave (IV) of the ISSP RoG we are working with. Intuitively,
the respondents could have been less inﬂation-averse if inﬂation has recently (in the run-up
to the survey year) been low. The recent average inﬂation rate, however, came out robustly
28as not statistically signiﬁcant, which excludes the possible alternative interpretation and
reinforces the one we proposed above. Second, as we saw, the high inﬂation dummy is
not signiﬁcant in many of the various speciﬁcations where the CBI index always enters
as well, and in the speciﬁcations with their interaction term. To see to what extent the
statistical signiﬁcance of the CBI index throughout our regressions may have invalidated
the statistical signiﬁcance of the high inﬂation dummy in separation (and/or of their
interaction term), we ran regressions 1.1 and 1.3 with including, alternatively, either the
high inﬂation dummy without the CBI index or vice versa, under our two weighting
schemes: see again the reported sensitivity analysis in tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. Both variables
were statistically signiﬁcant and had the right negative sign in (almost) all occasions
when each entered the regressions without the other one. This suggests the presence of
the two channels we analyzed in the theoretical part, in the sense that inclusion of the
(always signiﬁcant) CBI index reduces the signiﬁcance level of the high inﬂation dummy.
Our empirical ﬁnding of these two particular regressors being correlated is in line with
our theoretical set-up: namely, past experience with high inﬂation matters, as it leads to
higher inﬂation aversion and, hence, higher CBI, with the ultimate result in our data that
both regressors could potentially explain inﬂation aversion.35
5 Concluding Comments
In this paper we address the question of what drives the long-run evolution of inﬂation
preferences and monetary institutions. To do so, we extend the OLG framework of Bisin
and Verdier (2000, 2001), appropriate to study endogenous transmission of beliefs and
norms across generations. We, in eﬀect, modify their set-up to explore endogenously
derived and transmitted inﬂation preferences, dropping the assumption of cultural substi-
tution and replacing their deterministic model with a dynamic-stochastic environment of
adaptive learning. In the simplest cases, also examined in the earlier literature, where the
vertical transmission probabilities are either (i) exogenously ﬁxed or (ii) endogenous but
deterministic, there is a clear ‘separation’ of results. In the ﬁrst case, only one of the types
survives while the other is extinguished, and convergence depends on what we referred
to as the direction and the speed of changes in the structure of the population. In the
second case, convergence to an interior equilibrium with both types surviving is achieved
at the cost of assuming cultural substitution. Our theoretical contribution is to show
that, if the vertical transmission probabilities are a function of parent socialization eﬀorts
in response to observed changes in the conditional mean of inﬂation between successive
generations, our model generates much richer dynamics. It is characterized by switching
majorities and phases of high and low degree of inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni nt h ep o p u l a t i o na n d
corresponding degree of legislated monetary control we interpreted as CBI, ﬂuctuating
around an interior equilibrium for long, or forever (depending on initial conditions and
35Further analysis of our empirical results in the light of our inﬂation aversion measure by region of the
world is provided in the supplementary appendix.
29the properties of the assumed shock processes).
We then propose appropriate empirical tests of our theory, making use of a novel, own
measure of a nation’s inﬂation aversion constructed out of survey data. We report robust
cross-section evidence that a country’s demographic structure, in particular the variation
in the share of retirees (our proxy for the more inﬂation-averse type, as our model and
data suggested) or of their ratio to the share of workers (our proxy for the less inﬂation-
averse type), is a key driver of social preferences with regard to inﬂation. The presented
regressions also conﬁrm the importance of two other major long-run determinants of
inﬂation aversion consistent with our model, namely, experience with past high inﬂation
transmitted through socialization and the degree of CBI embodied in evolving monetary
institutions. Our econometric ﬁndings, thus, broadly support our analytical framework
and simulation results.
The model could be extended in several directions. On the theoretical side, allow-
ing for population growth, alternative modeling of the endogenous types and/or higher
heterogeneity of traits could provide valuable insights, as well as the examination of dif-
ferent processes guiding low-frequency inﬂation dynamics. On the empirical side, another
implementation compatible with slight modiﬁcations of the theory we proposed would
be to consider how the evolution of the proportions of net savers and borrowers in an
economy can inﬂuence its degree of inﬂation aversion, provided data become available on
a comparable cross-country basis.
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34inﬂation aversion mean median max min quant. s. d. skew. kurt. obs.
[60, 70) 0.674 0.674 0.674 0.674 0.674 — — — 1
[70, 80) 0.770 0.773 0.796 0.702 0.773 0.027 -1.96 5.83 9
[80, 90) 0.860 0.865 0.897 0.825 0.865 0.025 0.01 1.90 10
[90, 100) 0.946 0.937 0.980 0.910 0.937 0.023 0.07 1.54 13
all 0.864 0.870 0.980 0.674 0.870 0.083 -0.41 2.23 33
Table 1: Inﬂation Aversion — Descriptive Statistics by Quantile
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ISSP 2006 RoG IV.
35Regression 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4
intercept 1.1090*** 1.0531*** 0.9687*** 1.0490***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0012) (0.0048)
retirees/workers 0.3007*** 0.3223*** — —
(0.0012) (0.0002) — —
retirees share — — 0.4157*** 0.4654**
— — (0.0083) (0.0168)
workers share — — 0.2146 0.0187
— — (0.6079) (0.9748)
real GDP pc —2.81·10−6* —4.89·10−6** —3.55·10−6 —4.82·10−6**
(0.0650) (0.0418) (0.1326) (0.0378)
high inﬂation dummy —0.0336*** 0.0644 —0.0441** 0.0473
(0.0009) (0.3344) (0.0299) (0.6874)
CBI index —0.1524*** —0.1144*** —0.1542*** —0.1234**
(0.0028) (0.0091) (0.0031) (0.0226)
property rights index -0.1868** -0.0696 -0.1522 -0.0724
(0.0364) (0.6165) (0.1909) (0.5728)
CBI × high inﬂation — -0.1537 — -0.1312
— (0.1596) — (0.4124)
adjusted R2 0.9342 0.9386 0.9344 0.9353
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2: Determinants of Inﬂation Aversion — Population-WLS Estimates
Note: Coeﬃcients estimated by WLS using 2004 population weights from Heston et al. (2006)
for:
InflAverst= α + βRetireest+λRGDPpct
+γHighInflDumt+δCBIt+ηPropRst+ t.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
White correction for heteroskedasticity of unknown form applied.
36Regression 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
intercept 1.0884*** 1.1479*** 1.2496* 1.1571
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0523) (0.1195)
retirees/workers 0.3946*** 0.3132* — —
(0.0001) (0.0746) — —
retirees share — — 0.5708*** 0.4596*
— — (0.0000) (0.0684)
workers share — — —0.2294 —0.0089
— — (0.7982) (0.9941)
high inﬂation dummy —0.0186 —0.1043 —0.0178 —0.1129
(0.1635) (0.3395) (0.1745) (0.5305)
CBI index —0.1378*** —0.1501*** —0.1355* —0.1590
(0.0092) (0.0071) (0.0952) (0.1530)
property rights index —0.3179*** —0.3573*** —0.3255*** —0.3525***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0000)
CBI × high inﬂation — —0.1134 — 0.1256
— (0.4347) — (0.5990)
adjusted R2 0.8962 0.8960 0.8913 0.8911
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3: Determinants of Inﬂa t i o nA v e r s i o n—R e a lG D P - W L SE s t i m a t e s
Note: Coeﬃcients estimated by WLS using 2004 real GDP weights from Heston et al. (2006)
for:
InflAverst= α + βRetireest+γHighInflDumt+δCBIt+ηPropRst+ t.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
White correction for heteroskedasticity of unknown form applied.
37Regression 1.1.A 1.1.B 1.1.C
intercept 0.9768*** 1.0559*** 1.0976***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
retirees/workers 0.5599*** 0.4317*** 0.2216**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0128)
real GDP pc —4.02·10−6* —2.23·10−6 —2.92·10−6**
(0.0289) (0.2189) (0.0767)
high inﬂation dummy —0.0861*** —0.0503*** —
(0.0047) (0.0049) —
CBI index —— —0.1803***
—— (0.0013)
property rights index —0.1856* —0.3071*** —0.1292
(0.0690) (0.0016) (0.1448)
recent inﬂation 0.0065* ——
(0.0789) ——
adjusted R2 0.9103 0.9007 0.9234
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 4: Determinants of Inﬂation Aversion — Sensitivity Checks on Regression 1.1
Note: Coeﬃcients estimated by WLS using 2004 population weights from Heston et al. (2006)
for:
InflAverst= α + βRetireest+λRGDPpct
+γHighInflDumt+δCBIt+ηPropRst+κRInflt+ t.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
White correction for heteroskedasticity of unknown form applied.
38Regression 1.3.A 1.3.B 1.3.C
intercept 0.9473** 0.9070** 1.1791***
(0.0181) (0.0154) (0.0001)
retirees share 0.7898** 0.6028*** 0.3528*
(0.0112) (0.0073) (0.0861)
workers share 0.0586 0.2266 -0.1233
(0.9249) (0.6778) (0.7518)
real GDP pc —4.24·10−6* —3.08·10−6 —2.71·10−6
(0.0937) (0.2674) (0.2992)
high inﬂation dummy —0.0875** —0.0622*** —
(0.0165) (0.0346) —
CBI index —— —0.1806***
—— (0.0021)
property rights index —0.1782 —0.2676** —0.1398
(0.1241) (0.0430) (0.3463)
recent inﬂation 0.0056 ——
(0.2007) ——
adjusted R2 0.9037 0.8981 0.9207
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5: Determinants of Inﬂation Aversion — Sensitivity Checks on Regression 1.3
Note: Coeﬃcients estimated by WLS using 2004 population weights from Heston et al. (2006)
for:
InflAverst= α + βRetireest+λRGDPpct
+γHighInflDumt+δCBIt+ηPropRst+κRInflt+ t.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
White correction for heteroskedasticity of unknown form applied.
39Regression 2.1.A 2.1.B 2.1.C
intercept 1.0725*** 1.0550*** 1.0856***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
retirees/workers 0.4389 0.4741*** 0.3657**
(0.1539) (0.0003) (0.0000)
high inﬂation dummy —0.0861 —0.0414*** —
(0.1670) (0.0023) —
CBI index —— —0.1592***
—— (0.0000)
property rights index —0.4209*** —0.4118*** —0.2916
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
recent inﬂation —0.0011 ——
(0.8661) ——
adjusted R2 0.8593 0.8639 0.8953
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 6: Determinants of Inﬂation Aversion — Sensitivity Checks on Regression 2.1
Note: Coeﬃcients estimated by WLS using 2004 real GDP weights from Heston et al. (2006)
for:
InflAverst= α + βRetireest+γHighInflDumt
+δCBIt+ηPropRst+κRInflt+ t.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
White correction for heteroskedasticity of unknown form applied.
40Regression 2.3.A 2.3.B 2.3.C
intercept 1.7201** 1.7145*** 1.2419*
(0.0197) (0.0095) (0.0501)
retirees share 0.5933 0.5727*** 0.5304***
(0.1988) (0.0092) (0.0000)
workers share —0.9224 —0.9041 —0.2217
(0.4183) (0.3053) (0.8025)
high inﬂation dummy —0.0355 —0.0341** —
(0.1600) (0.0344) —
CBI index —— —0.1557**
—— (0.0349)
property rights index —0.4493*** —0.4525*** —0.3005***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0008)
recent inﬂation 0.0005 ——
(0.9568) ——
adjusted R2 0.8637 0.8685 0.8908
F-statistic p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 7: Determinants of Inﬂation Aversion — Sensitivity Checks on Regression 2.3
Note: Coeﬃcients estimated by WLS using 2004 real GDP weights from Heston et al. (2006)
for:
InflAverst= α + βRetireest+γHighInflDumt
+δCBIt+ηPropRst+κRInflt+ t.
∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
White correction for heteroskedasticity of unknown form applied.
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Figure 2: Deterministic Exogenous Convergence to Type-a Preferences (for details and
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Figure 3: Deterministic Exogenous Convergence to Type-b Preferences (for details and























Mean       -1.69e-16
Median   -0.000591
Maximum   0.120632
Minimum -0.162963
Std. Dev.    0.062689
Skewness   -0.444323


























Mean        0.001009
Median    0.002676
Maximum   0.109216
Minimum -0.096311
Std. Dev.    0.037508
Skewness   -0.206856
Kurtosis    5.518886
Jarque-Bera  8.959422
Probability  0.011337
Figure 4: Regression Residuals Analysis — Heteroskedasticity of Residuals from OLS (top
left panel) and from WLS (bottom left panel): countries in the sample on the x-axis (1
to 33) in ascending order of population; and Normality of Residuals from OLS (top right
panel) and from WLS (bottom right panel)
45FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION: Supplementary Appendix
This supplementary appendix provides further details on aspects of our data sources
and deﬁnitions (section A), our novel measure of inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o n( s e c t i o nB ) ,a n do u r
simulations (section C). For replication purposes, an additional *.zipx ﬁle archive is also
available online; it contains our data set, codes and the respective input and output ﬁles.
A Data Sources and Deﬁnitions
• Degree of Inﬂation Aversion
— Source: International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on the role of government
in society (Role of Government, wave IV) conducted by the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research in 2006 for 33 participating coun-
tries.
— Deﬁnition: authors’ computations, summing up the percentage shares of re-
sponses falling in the ﬁrst two categories of answers (highlighted in Italics
among the enumerated below) to the following question (7b):
∗ ‘On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government’s
responsibility to keep prices under control?’
∗ the potential answers proposed to the respondents are:
· ‘deﬁnitely should be’;
· ‘probably should be’;
· ‘probably should not be’;




— Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (annual series by coun-
try: April 2008 and June 2009 issues, accessed via ESDS), for the year 2006;
except for Taiwan (see below); World Bank staﬀ estimates from various sources
including census reports, the United Nations Population Division’s World Pop-
ulation Prospects, national statistical oﬃces, household surveys conducted by
national agencies, and Macro International.
— Deﬁnitions:
∗ population, total (SP.POP.TOTL);
46∗ share of retirees: Population ages 65 or older (% of older, SP.POP.65
UP.TO.ZS);
∗ s h a r eo fw o r k i n ga g ep o p u l a t i o n :Population ages 15-64 (% of total,
SP.POP.1564.TO.ZS).
— Source for Taiwan: authors’ computations of the above shares in the total
population based on disaggregated data for the year 2000 by age groups from
the National Statistics Republic of China (Taiwan); www.eng.stat.gov.tw.
• Institutions
— Sources:
∗ central bank independence (CBI) index: from Arnone et al. (2009),
for the year 2003; except for Taiwan: from Ahsan et al. (2008), for the
late 2000s;
∗ property rights index: from The Heritage Foundation, for the year
2009; www.heritage.org;
∗ high inﬂation dummy: authors’ coding in conformity with Fischer et al.
(2002).
• Macroeconomic Data
— Source: Penn World Table Version 6.2 — see Heston et al. (2006); for the year
2004.
∗ population;
∗ real GDP per capita, in PPP-USD;
∗ real GDP,i nP P P - U S D : authors’ computations multiplying the above
two numbers.
BS u r v e y - B a s e d I n ﬂation Aversion Index by Region
Putting the empirical results we reported in the article in a regional perspective is another
worthwhile way to cross-check their relevance. Table 8 here below organizes our survey-
based measure of absolute inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o nb yr e g i o no ft h ew o r l d . 36
36Country codes as in the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on the role of government
in society (Role of Government, wave IV), namely: AU: Australia, CA: Canada, CH: Switzerland,
CL: Chile, CZ: Czech Republic, DE: Germany, DK: Denmark, DO: Dominican Republic, ES:
Spain, FI: Finland, FR: France, GB: Great Britain, HR: Croatia, HU: Hungary, IE: Ireland, IL:
Israel, JP: Japan, KR: Korea, LV: Latvia, NL: Netherlands, NO: Norway, NZ: New Zealand, PH:
Philippines, PO: Poland, PT: Portugal, RU: Russia, SE: Sweden, SI: Slovenia, TW: Taiwan, US:
United States, UY: Uruguay, VE: Venezuela, ZA: South Africa.
47inﬂation aversion
Advanced economies (17 countries)
European EMU (7) FI FR DE IE NL PT ES
mean: 0.857 (s.d.: 0.076) 0.786 0.828 0.783 0.930 0.796 0.963 0.910
European non-EMU (5) DK NO SE CH GB
mean: 0.823 (s.d.: 0.053) 0.773 0.895 0.825 0.772 0.852
non-European (5) AU CA JP NZ US
mean: 0.806 (s.d.: 0.088) 0.868 0.702 0.923 0.769 0.770
Emerging market economies (16 countries)
European (7) HR CZ HU LV PO RU SI
mean: 0.839 (s.d.: 0.094) 0.870 0.674 0.870 0.836 0.780 0.980 0.861
non-European (9) CL DO IL KR PH ZA TW UY VE
mean: 0.943 (s.d.: 0.026) 0.930 0.967 0.897 0.967 0.958 0.931 0.974 0.923 0.937
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ISSP 2006 RoG IV.
Table 8: Inﬂation Aversion — Descriptive Statistics by Country Groups
First, it appears that countries belonging to the European Monetary Union (EMU)
share a higher degree of inﬂation aversion than the rest of the sample and, interestingly,
that this degree is higher than for countries that belong to the European Union (EU), but
are not members of the EMU.37 This tends to show that the adoption of a high degree
of independence for the European Central Bank probably has not yet infused the whole
population. That institutions do not have immediate impacts, but may need time to
establish their credentials, is again in agreement with our model. This latter claim is also
conﬁrmed by comparing the inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o nl e v e l si nG e r m a n ya n di nR u s s i a .T h o u g h
both countries have suﬀered from hyperinﬂation, Germany has since had time to build
inﬂation averse institutions (notably the Bundesbank, before joining the EMU), while
Russia’s central bank has still not been granted full independence from the government.
Second, and even more interesting is the high degree of inﬂa t i o na v e r s i o ni ne m e r g i n g
market economies, and particularly among the non-European ones (94.3%), especially
once one remarks that the regions where inﬂation aversion is the highest in our sample
are also the ones with the lowest standard deviation. The high level of inﬂation aver-
sion in these economies can be related to their chronic inﬂationary experience but weak
institutions.
Third, the Czech Republic has the lowest level of inﬂation aversion in our sample. This
can notably be explained by the strong degree of central bank independence of its central
bank (0.88, superior to the sample average of 0.72), reinforced over the last decade by the
adoption of inﬂation-forecast targeting. Moreover, most of the countries that have in the
past generation span implemented such an inﬂation targeting regime manifest lower levels
37We should be cautious with such interpretations in so far as central bank independence (CBI) in
accession countries is not just a matter of social preferences. It is also, or rather, a prerequisite for joining
the EMU (and hence the EU as well). Thus being part of the ‘acquis communautaire’, CBI does not
reﬂect just national preferences in the accession countries (unless one makes the argument that countries
would abstain from joining EU in order not to be forced to make their central banks independent).
48of inﬂation aversion (in addition to the Czech Republic, that is the case for Canada, New
Zealand, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom). This tends to show that inﬂation targeting
can back the more institutionalized degree of CBI.38
To sum up, in our view this additional analysis of our measure of (absolute) inﬂation
aversion by region summarized above is largely supportive of the model predictions in the
article too. It broadly conﬁrms that the underlying evolution of a society’s preferences
is fundamental to observed macroeconomic trends such as, in our case, cross-sectional
inﬂation aversion variation. This regional perspective also seems to suggest that indi-
viduals may vary their socialization eﬀorts to transmit their preferences, depending on
the historical and institutional context of learning experiences and the ensuing relative
incentives they have to face.
C Illustrative Summary of Simulations
We propose, ﬁnally, an illustrative summary of our simulations, described in subsection 3.3
of our article. The summary here only collects a subset of ﬁgures capturing 9 key cases of
cyclical variation around interior equilibria of the fraction of the more inﬂation-averse type
(type a)o v e rat i m eh o r i z o no f1000 periods (equal to adult-life generation spans, as per
our model). All these 9 cases are characterized by low (and constant, in the simulations)
endogenous (as discussed in subsection 3.3 of the paper) vertical inﬂation diﬀerential, i.e.,
¯ ¯τa (·) − τb (·)
¯ ¯ =0 .1: this is the case (among those explored in our simulations) most
likely to result in convergence to ﬂuctuating interior equilibria. Our illustrative ﬁgures
present next the alternative parametrizations in these 9 cases (self-explaining from the
titles and notes in each of the ﬁgures and from the corresponding discussion in subsection
3.3), all starting from an initial condition for qa
0 =0 .50000001.39 We do not show below
all analogous 9 cases when allowing for
¯ ¯τa (·) − τb (·)
¯ ¯ =0 .2 and the corresponding 9
cases when taking
¯ ¯τa (·) − τb (·)
¯ ¯ =0 .5 instead.
In addition, we have simulated over 1000 periods the same 27(= 9 × 3) cases of the
above paragraph under, alternatively, qa
0 =0 .49999999, qa
0 =0 .25 and qa
0 =0 .75, and these
results are available upon request. The respective four (for the four initial conditions
for qa
0) basic underlying R programs (whose parameters can be varied accordingly in
replicating the essence of our ﬁndings) have been made available online in a *.zipx ﬁle
archive.
38The exceptions (i.e., inﬂation targeters that show slightly higher degrees of inﬂation aversion) are
Australia and Hungary. Both countries have, however, recently known episodes of strong growth, for
the former, or political instability, for the latter, which may have re-ignited inﬂation scares among the
population.
39Note that, as we mentioned in the article, the simulation cases where the mean of the inﬂation shock is
assumed zero eliminate, by construction in the codes, the drift term in the low-frequency AR(1) stochastic
process for inﬂation as well as the feedback from the CBI (or institutional) channel.
























infl(0)=eps_mu=0, eps_sigma=1, rnorm, rho=0.1



























































Figure 5: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, low inﬂation persis-
tence, zero mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Gat


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, low inﬂation persis-
tence, zero mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















infl(0)=eps_mu=2, eps_sigma=1, rnorm, rho=0.1



























































Figure 7: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, low inﬂation persis-
tence, low mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Gat


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, low inﬂation persis-
tence, low mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock
















infl(0)=eps_mu=6, eps_sigma=3, rnorm, rho=0.1



























































Figure 9: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, low inﬂation persis-
tence, high mean and high variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Gat


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, low inﬂation persis-
tence, low mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock




















infl(0)=eps_mu=0, eps_sigma=1, rnorm, rho=0.5



























































Figure 11: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, moderate inﬂation
persistence, zero mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Gat


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, moderate inﬂation
persistence, zero mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















infl(0)=eps_mu=2, eps_sigma=1, rnorm, rho=0.5



























































Figure 13: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, moderate inﬂation
persistence, low mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Gat


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, low inﬂation persis-
tence, low mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock






infl(0)=eps_mu=6, eps_sigma=3, rnorm, rho=0.5



























































Figure 15: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, moderate inﬂation
persistence, high mean and high variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Ga


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, moderate inﬂation
persistence, high mean and high variance of the inﬂation shock






















infl(0)=eps_mu=0, eps_sigma=1, rnorm, rho=0.9



























































Figure 17: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, high inﬂation persis-
tence, zero mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Gat


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, high inﬂation persis-
tence, zero mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















infl(0)=eps_mu=2, eps_sigma=1, rnorm, rho=0.9



























































Figure 19: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, high inﬂation persis-
tence, low mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Gat


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, high inﬂation persis-
tence, low mean and unit variance of the inﬂation shock









infl(0)=eps_mu=6, eps_sigma=3, rnorm, rho=0.9



























































Figure 21: b πt dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, high inﬂation persis-
tence, high mean and high variance of the inﬂation shock



















qa(0)=0.5+; dtau=abs(0.1); Gat=-inflmt=-eps_mu, Gbt=0.5Gat


















































t dynamics under low vertical transmission diﬀerential, high inﬂation persis-
tence, high mean and high variance of the inﬂation shock
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